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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge 
Omar Sierre Folk appeals the District Court’s order 
denying his Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment 
denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argues that the 
District Court enhanced his sentence based on an incorrect 
career-offender designation under the advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines. He also moves to expand his certificate of 
appealability. Because Folk’s claim is not cognizable under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, we will affirm the District Court’s order and 
deny his motion to expand the certificate of appealability. 
I 
Folk was convicted by a federal jury of one count of 
distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; two counts 
of using a firearm to further a drug trafficking offense, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and one count of felon in 
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
Before sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”) deemed Folk a career offender under U.S.S.G. 
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§ 4B1.1 because he had at least two prior felony convictions 
for “crimes of violence.”1 As a result, the PSR recommended 
enhancing Folk’s Guidelines range from a sentence between 
384 and 465 months’ imprisonment to a sentence between 420 
months and life imprisonment. 
At sentencing, the District Court discussed Folk’s four 
previous convictions with the parties and whether the 
convictions constituted crimes of violence. The convictions 
included two robberies in 2001, simple assault in 2003, and 
terroristic threats in 2003. The District Court adopted the 
PSR’s recommended Guidelines range but sentenced Folk to 
264 months’ imprisonment—120 months less than the bottom 
of the unenhanced Guidelines range and 156 months less than 
the bottom of the enhanced Guidelines range. Folk appealed 
his conviction, but we affirmed. See United States v. Folk, 577 
F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2014). Importantly, Folk did not 
challenge his sentence or his career-offender designation. 
Then, the Federal Public Defender filed a timely § 2255 
motion on Folk’s behalf. In his § 2255 motion, Folk argued that 
his career-offender designation was invalid because Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), rendered § 4B1.2(a) 
void for vagueness. Folk decided to proceed pro se and filed 
several motions to amend his § 2255 motion. The District 
Court ultimately denied Folk’s § 2255 motion. 
Finally, Folk filed a notice of appeal and a motion to 
alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e). We stayed his appeal pending the District 
Court’s resolution of the Rule 59(e) motion. Folk’s Rule 59(e) 
motion argued that his robbery, simple assault, and terroristic 
threats convictions do not constitute crimes of violence, so the 
District Court erroneously designated him as a career offender. 
 
1 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2012) provides that “[a] defendant is a 
career offender if . . . [he] has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled 
substance offense.” A “crime of violence” is an offense 
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that 
involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another,” or is an otherwise 
specified offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2012). 
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The District Court denied the motion. Folk then filed an 
amended notice of appeal. 
Folk’s certificate of appealability identified two issues 
for review: (1) whether an erroneous career-offender 
designation is cognizable under § 2255; and (2) whether he 
was correctly designated as a career offender.2  
After we issued the certificate of appealability, Folk 
moved to expand the certificate of appealability and to 
supplement his appeal. Folk argued that his conviction for 
possession of 280 grams of cocaine is invalid under United 
States v. Rowe, 919 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that 
separate acts of distribution of controlled substances are 
distinct offenses rather than a continuing crime). The motion 
to expand the certificate of appealability was referred to this 
panel and remains pending. 
II 
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Folk’s § 2255 motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2255. We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253(a). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual 
findings for clear error. United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 
142 (3d Cir. 2015). 
III 
The first issue we must address is whether a challenge 
to an incorrect career-offender designation under the advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines is cognizable under § 2255. Folk says 
that it is.3 We disagree. 
 
2 The parties identified other issues in their briefs on appeal, 
including an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. But the 
certificate of appealability designated only two issues for 
review, and we need not consider uncertified issues. See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 22.1(b)–(c); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 
3 For this analysis, we assume without deciding that the District 




Under § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, 
set aside, or correct his federal sentence if: (1) “the sentence 
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States”; (2) the court lacked “jurisdiction to impose” 
the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeded “the maximum 
authorized by law”; or (4) the sentence is “otherwise subject to 
collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
The statute’s language “is somewhat lacking in 
precision” but “afford[s] federal prisoners a remedy identical 
in scope to federal habeas corpus [under 28 U.S.C. § 2254].” 
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). The scope of 
relief does not reach “every asserted error of law.” Id. at 346. 
Rather, § 2255 provides relief for jurisdictional and 
constitutional claims, as well as for certain nonconstitutional 
claims. 
Folk’s career-offender Guideline claim does not satisfy 
the first three bases for § 2255 relief. He does not assert that 
his sentence violates the Constitution or federal law. Folk does 
not argue that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to impose 
the sentence. Nor can he argue that his sentence exceeds the 
maximum authorized by law because each of his federal 
convictions permitted a maximum of life imprisonment. See 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (permitting any 
sentence exceeding five years); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) 
(requiring a sentence to exceed 15 years). So, to justify 
receiving § 2255 relief, Folk’s nonconstitutional claim—based 
on an incorrect career-offender enhancement—must 
“otherwise subject” his sentence to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(a); see Bullard v. United States, 937 F.3d 654, 658 (6th 
Cir. 2019).  
Nonconstitutional claims that otherwise subject a 
sentence to collateral attack fall between two poles. See Doe, 
810 F.3d at 155. At one end are plainly cognizable claims, such 
as a federal prisoner’s claims that he is “either actually 
innocent of his crime” or that his “prior conviction used to 
enhance his sentence has been vacated[.]” Spencer v. United 
States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(referencing Davis, 417 U.S. at 346–47 and Johnson v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 295, 303 (2005)); see also Doe, 810 F.3d at 
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155 (citing Davis, 417 U.S. at 343). On the other end are 
plainly noncognizable claims, which include technical 
procedural violations that do not prejudice a defendant. See, 
e.g., Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 27–28 (1999) 
(holding that a district court’s failure to notify a defendant of 
his right to appeal was not cognizable when the defendant 
knew of the right and was not prejudiced). 
Supreme Court precedent recognizes that § 2255 may 
remedy a nonconstitutional claim such as a flawed sentence in 
two circumstances. See Doe, 810 F.3d at 155 (noting that Reed 
v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994), explains how to fill the narrow 
space “between [the] poles”). First, if a sentencing error 
resulted in “an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary 
demands of fair procedure.” United States v. Timmreck, 441 
U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (citation omitted). Second, if a sentencing 
error constitutes “a fundamental defect which inherently 
results in a complete miscarriage of justice[.]” Id.4 
B 
A misapplication of the career-offender Guideline is not 
an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure. Sentencing errors that qualify as “omission[s] 
inconsistent with” fair procedure include procedural errors that 
prejudice a defendant. Doe, 810 F.3d at 155 (quoting Reed, 512 
U.S. at 348 (plurality opinion)). Ordinarily, the procedural 
error is the failure “to give a defendant advice required by the 
Federal Rules [of Criminal Procedure].” Peguero, 526 U.S. at 
27–28 (holding that a district court’s failure to notify a 
defendant of his right to appeal was not cognizable when the 
 
4 Relying on the plurality opinion in Reed v. Farley, this Court 
suggested that “aggravating circumstances” amount to a third 
standalone basis for § 2255 relief for nonconstitutional claims. 
See Doe, 810 F.3d at 155. The Supreme Court has not 
“expressly adopted [the aggravating circumstances] exception 
or defined its parameters.” Pethtel v. Ballard, 617 F.3d 299, 
305 (4th Cir. 2010). But we need not resolve that tension here 
because Folk does not argue that aggravating circumstances 
exist. Nor would his claim meet the requirements for relief 
under an aggravating-circumstances theory. See, e.g., Reed, 
512 U.S. at 357 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
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defendant knew of the right and was not prejudiced by the 
failure); see also Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784–85 (declining to 
find cognizable a procedural error under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11 absent aggravating circumstances); Hill 
v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (holding that a 
district court’s failure to notify a defendant of his right to speak 
at his sentencing did not prejudice him and was not a 
cognizable claim under § 2255); cf. Reed, 512 U.S. at 349–51 
(plurality opinion) (holding that, in a § 2254 proceeding, a state 
court’s failure to observe speedy trial requirements was not 
cognizable when the failure did not prejudice the defendant). 
Peguero, Timmreck, and Hill each involved a district 
court’s failure to notify a defendant of certain rights under the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Reed involved a district 
court’s failure to follow certain procedural timing rules. Folk 
does not complain that the District Court failed to notify him 
of his rights under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Nor does he assert any other procedural error. His case is 
therefore not analogous to Peguero, Hill, and Timmreck, which 
recognized that a prejudicial procedural violation may be 
cognizable under § 2255.5 
In Doe, a panel of this Court held that a misapplication 
of the career-offender designation under the mandatory 
Guidelines was cognizable. Doe’s holding relied, in part, on 
Peguero. This Court said that “the incorrect computation of a 
mandatory Guidelines range” based on an erroneous career-
offender designation “is at least as serious as the error 
 
5 A miscalculation of a Guidelines range is a procedural error. 
See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 
District Court’s designation of Folk as a career offender—a 
substantive decision—increased Folk’s Guidelines range. See, 
e.g., Doe, 810 F.3d at 159 (noting that a “substantive error”—
like a career-offender designation—results in “more time in 
prison”); see also Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 
n.11 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The misapplication of the career-
offender status—which increased Mr. Narvaez’s sentencing 
range—is certainly a substantive error.”); United States v. 
Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1116–17 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that 
a sentence was substantively unreasonable because it failed to 
account for a defendant’s career-offender status).  
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discussed in Peguero and thus should also be cognizable 
[when] the mistake prejudices the defendant.” Doe, 810 F.3d 
at 159. 
Doe involved a substantive error. Peguero (and its 
predecessor cases at the Supreme Court) involved procedural 
errors that potentially caused prejudice. Doe thus blended the 
two avenues of § 2255 relief. Relying on Doe, Folk argues that 
the District Court’s allegedly erroneous career-offender 
designation prejudiced him. For example, Folk parrots Doe and 
argues that the alleged “substantive error, like more time in 
prison, is doubtless more serious than procedural error, like 
failure by the [sic] court to advise someone of appellate 
rights[.]” Appellant’s Reply Br. 3 (quoting Doe, 810 F.3d at 
159). 
But the Supreme Court has never conducted a prejudice 
inquiry when deciding whether a substantive nonconstitutional 
error—rather than a procedural error—is cognizable under 
§ 2255. We decline Folk’s invitation to do so here.6 Because 
Folk does not complain of a prejudicial procedural error, his 
claim is not cognizable under § 2255 as “an omission 
 
6 Even if we analyzed the prejudice to Folk as Doe suggested, 
Folk still would not prevail. Folk notes that the career-offender 
designation increased his advisory Guidelines range by one 
level. His resulting range was 420 months to life imprisonment. 
Without the increase, his Guidelines range would have been 
384 to 465 months’ imprisonment. He argues that he therefore 
“suffered prejudice because he was sentenced under an 
incorrect Guidelines range regardless of whether the ultimate 
sentence falls within the correct Guideline[s] range upon 
remand.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 4. But the District Court 
sentenced Folk to 264 months’ imprisonment—ten years 
below the bottom end of the Guidelines range without the 
career-offender enhancement. Folk is hard pressed to show that 
his below-the-Guidelines-range sentence constitutes a 
complete miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., United States v. 
Hoskins, 905 F.3d 97, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that a 




inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” 
Reed, 512 U.S. at 348 (plurality opinion). 
C 
In Doe, we held that an incorrect career-offender 
designation under the mandatory Guidelines is a fundamental 
defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice 
cognizable under § 2255. See 810 F.3d at 160. But United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005), made the 
Guidelines advisory. We have not yet addressed whether an 
incorrect career-offender designation under the advisory 
Guidelines is cognizable under § 2255.  
Nearly every other circuit court of appeals has held or 
suggested that such a claim is not cognizable.7 Today, we join 
 
7 See Snider, 908 F.3d at 189 (holding that the defendant’s 
nonconstitutional “challenge to his advisory guidelines range 
suffers from a great defect: it is not cognizable under § 2255”); 
United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931, 940 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(same); Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1144 (en banc) (same); Hawkins 
v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2013), opinion 
supplemented on denial of reh’g, 724 F.3d 915 (same); Sun 
Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704–05 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (holding that because applying the career-offender 
Guideline is an ordinary question of Guidelines interpretation, 
the error is not a fundamental defect resulting in a complete 
miscarriage of justice and is not cognizable under § 2255). 
The Fifth Circuit has held that “[§] 2255 motions may 
raise only constitutional errors and other injuries that could not 
have been raised on direct appeal that will result in a 
miscarriage of justice if left unaddressed.” United States v. 
Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). Because “[m]isapplications of the 
Sentencing Guidelines fall into neither category . . . [they] are 
not cognizable in § 2255 motions.” Id. Because of this blanket 
prohibition, the Fifth Circuit has not expansively delineated the 
rule, unlike other circuits. 
Two other circuits have faced the issue. The Second 
Circuit avoided drawing a “categorical conclusion,” but 
identified “the advisory nature of the challenged career 
offender Guidelines as one factor, among others,” that 
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our sister circuits and hold that an incorrect career-offender 
enhancement under the advisory guidelines is not cognizable 
under § 2255 because it is not a fundamental defect that 
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice. 
Our conclusion is buttressed by four rationales: (1) the 
lawfulness of a sentence within the statutory limit; (2) the 
advisory nature of the Guidelines; (3) an interest in finality; 
and (4) a concern about workable standards. 
1 
Even when based on an incorrect advisory career-
offender enhancement, a sentence within the statutory 
maximum is lawful. See Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1138 (noting that 
a sentence is lawful if it is “less than the statutory maximum 
sentence prescribed by Congress” (citing United States v. 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1979)); cf. United States v. 
Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that 
statutory ranges “set the floor and the ceiling within which a 
district court must sentence, thereby . . . limit[ing] the extent to 
which a district court may permissibly stray from the 
Guidelines range” (citations omitted)). And a lawful sentence 
is not a complete miscarriage of justice. See Addonizio, 442 
U.S. at 186–87. So an incorrect career-offender designation 
that results in a sentence within the statutory maximum is not 
a fundamental defect inherently resulting in a complete 
miscarriage of justice and cannot be cognizable under § 2255. 
District courts possess “broad discretion in imposing a 
sentence within a statutory range.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. 
When sentencing defendants, district courts must consider the 
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which includes the kinds of 
 
precludes showing that a below- or within-Guidelines sentence 
is a “complete miscarriage of justice.” Hoskins, 905 F.3d at 104 
n.7. The First Circuit avoided the issue entirely by deciding a 
case on alternative grounds. See Cuevas v. United States, 778 
F.3d 267, 272 (1st Cir. 2015) (declining to address “the 
cognizability of a claim, like the one at issue in [Folk’s case], 




sentences and the sentencing range suggested for certain 
violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4).  
So long as a district court considers the § 3553(a) 
factors and imposes a sentence within the statutory limits for 
an offense, the criminal proceeding will not be “infected with 
any error of fact or law of the ‘fundamental’ character.” See 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 186. Such a sentence is lawful and 
cannot be a complete miscarriage of justice. 
Even if a sentencing error affects “the way in which the 
[sentencing] court’s judgment and sentence [will] be 
performed,” it does not “affect the lawfulness of the judgment 
itself—then or now.” Foote, 784 F.3d at 937 (quoting 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 187); see also Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 
821–22, 824, opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g, 724 
F.3d 915 (noting that a “sentence that is well below the ceiling 
imposed by Congress” is not a complete miscarriage of justice 
even if the imposed sentence were “far above the [G]uidelines 
range that would have been applicable had the career offender 
guideline not been in play”). 
For example, in Addonizio, the district court sentenced 
the defendant under the belief that the defendant would be 
eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence. 442 
U.S. at 186. After the defendant was sentenced, the parole 
commission changed its rules, which subjected the defendant 
to more time in prison before he would be eligible for parole. 
The district court’s incorrect assumption did not infect the 
proceeding “with any error of fact or law of the ‘fundamental’ 
character” and did not merit § 2255 relief. Id. 
Based on Addonizio, other circuit courts have concluded 
that a sentencing error is not a fundamental defect requiring 
§ 2255 relief when a prisoner is sentenced below the statutory 
maximum. See Foote, 784 F.3d at 937; see also Spencer, 773 
F.3d at 1138 (citing Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 186–87) (noting 
that a sentence “less than the statutory maximum sentence 
prescribed by Congress” is lawful, and thus not a fundamental 
defect); Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 822, 824; Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 
705; cf. Snider, 908 F.3d at 191 (citing Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 
187) (noting that the defendant’s corrected sentence would fall 




Because the Guidelines are advisory and merely one 
factor considered within a sentencing court’s discretion, an 
incorrect career-offender enhancement is not a fundamental 
defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. 
First, oddities may arise if a court “declare[s] that a 
fundamental defect or a complete miscarriage of justice has 
occurred in a situation in which” a defendant could receive the 
same sentence “under an advisory Guidelines scheme requiring 
individualized analysis of the sentencing factors set forth in . . . 
§ 3553(a).” Foote, 784 F.3d at 941. Even if a court provided 
§ 2255 relief for an erroneous career-offender designation, “the 
district court could [still] impose the same sentence again.” 
Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1140 (collecting cases); see also Sun 
Bear, 644 F.3d at 705 (noting that the same sentence could be 
reimposed); Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824–25 (acknowledging that 
the district court might have imposed a lower sentence but did 
not have to do so). 
Second, the advisory Guidelines merely inform “the 
exercise of a [sentencing] court’s discretion in choosing an 
appropriate sentence within the statutory range.” Beckles v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). It is true that the 
advisory Guidelines are the “starting point and the initial 
benchmark for sentencing.” Id. at 894 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. 
at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted)). But “the advisory 
Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of sentences.” Id. 
at 892. “[A] sentencing court may no longer rely exclusively 
on the Guidelines range; rather, the court must make an 
individualized assessment based on the facts presented and the 
other statutory factors.” Id. at 894 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 
49 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Holding otherwise would transform the “advisory” 
Guidelines into more than a discretionary guide and undermine 
Booker. The Guidelines lack legal force and are not 
“tantamount to the laws of Congress” because they are 
advisory and therefore not binding on a district court. Spencer, 
773 F.3d at 1142 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 395 (1989)); see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 
476, 501 (2011) (noting that “a district court may in 
appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on 
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a disagreement with the [Sentencing] Commission’s views”). 
So, a Guidelines error is not a fundamental defect like a 
“violation of a statute or constitutional provision” and does not 
inherently result in a complete miscarriage of justice. See 
Foote, 784 F.3d at 942. 
3 
An interest in finality cautions against finding that an 
erroneous career-offender enhancement is a fundamental 
defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. 
Section 2255 does not provide relief for “every asserted error 
of law.” Davis, 417 U.S. at 346. It strikes a balance “between 
the interest in finality and the injustice of a possibly mistaken 
sentence,” such as one imposed after an incorrect career-
offender designation. Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 825. Allowing 
collateral challenges based on sentencing errors under the 
advisory Guidelines “would deal a wide-ranging blow to the 
judicial system’s interest in finality.” Foote, 784 F.3d at 943 
(citing Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184). Given a district court’s 
discretion and the advisory nature of the Guidelines, an 
incorrect career-offender designation is not the type of defect 
that supports undermining finality. See Spencer, 773 F.3d at 
1144; Foote, 784 F.3d at 943. 
4 
There is no manageable limit to the types of sentencing 
errors that would be cognizable under § 2255 if an incorrect 
career-offender enhancement were found to be cognizable. 
“[I]t is hard to fathom what the dividing line would be between 
a fundamental defect and mere error” when applying the 
advisory Guidelines. Foote, 784 F.3d at 943. Courts may 
struggle “to catalog the subset of miscalculations of advisory 
[G]uidelines that are miscarriages of justice that can be 
corrected in [federal] postconviction proceedings.” Hawkins, 
706 F.3d at 825. 
Perhaps we could establish a rule that an incorrect 
career-offender enhancement qualifies for § 2255 relief 
because it is more serious than other sentencing errors. After 
all, the miscalculation increases the Guidelines range. But 
nearly all Guidelines errors will affect the range. See Spencer, 
773 F.3d at 1142 (citation omitted). On one hand, limiting 
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§ 2255 relief only to misapplications of the career-offender 
designation would be underinclusive. See Foote, 784 F.3d at 
943. But, if any sentencing error is cognizable on collateral 
review, then the rule would be overinclusive and disrupt 
finality. Id.; see also Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 825 (noting that the 
defendant’s argument requires “all [sentencing] errors (except, 
presumably, harmless ones) [to be] miscarriages of justice”). 
The breadth of such a rule would make the limited relief 
offered by § 2255 a boundless opportunity for criminal 
defendants to re-challenge their sentences. 
D 
Folk argues that this Court’s decision in Doe and 
Supreme Court opinions discussing the advisory Guidelines 
require a different outcome. We disagree. 
In Doe, we held that an erroneous career-offender 
designation under the mandatory Guidelines is cognizable 
under § 2255. 810 F.3d at 160. We reasoned that the 
“misclassification of the defendant as a career offender [was] 
at least as serious as the error discussed in Peguero” and 
“should also be cognizable [when] the mistake prejudices the 
defendant.” Id. at 159. When discussing prejudice to the 
defendant, Doe noted that the career-offender status applies to 
“a subgroup of defendants . . . that traditionally has been 
treated very differently from other offenders.” Id. (internal 
quotation mark and citation omitted). Doe then concluded that 
the “misapplication of the mandatory career-offender 
Guideline, when such a misapplication prejudices the 
[d]efendant, results in a sentence substantively not authorized 
by law and is therefore subject to attack on collateral review.” 
Id. at 160. 
To reach the conclusion, this Court noted that 
“sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines” and 
even the advisory Guidelines “exert controlling influence on 
the sentence that the [sentencing] court will impose.” Id. 
(quoting Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541, 545 
(2013)). We emphasized that the mandatory Guidelines carry 
“even greater force.” Id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 234). Doe 
also rejected the suggestion that a sentence within a statutory 
limit that violates the mandatory Guidelines is lawful and thus 
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cannot be challenged under § 2255. Id. We stated that Peugh 
and Booker rendered this conclusion “implausible.” Id. 
Folk adopts Doe’s approach and relies on Peugh and 
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016), to 
argue that Doe’s holding applies to the advisory Guidelines. 
Folk emphasizes that Doe looked to “the actual world of 
sentencing.” Doe, 810 F.3d at 160. He argues that “the 
determinative role the advisory Guidelines continue to hold at 
federal sentencing, which is de facto similar to the role held by 
the mandatory Guidelines” requires us to apply Doe here. 
Appellant’s Br. 48. Folk’s argument is incorrect for several 
reasons. 
First, Doe’s narrow holding specifically did not extend 
to the advisory Guidelines. See 810 F.3d at 160 (“Our holding 
is narrow, and we do not consider challenges to the advisory 
Guidelines[.]”). 
Second, the advisory Guidelines do not have “the force 
and effect of laws.” See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234. They are but 
one factor among many statutory factors that a district court 
considers when exercising its discretion at sentencing. So a 
district court may have multiple possible rationales supporting 
a sentence. See United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 165 (4th 
Cir. 2008). A sentencing court is free to deviate from a 
Guidelines range within its discretion and after consideration 
of the mandatory factors in § 3553(a). Indeed, the District 
Court sentenced Folk to a term of imprisonment ten years 
below the bottom end of the Guidelines range without the 
career-offender enhancement. 
What’s more, a sentencing court cannot presume the 
reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence. See Nelson v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (“The Guidelines are 
not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not 
to be presumed reasonable.” (emphasis in original)). In sum, 
the Guidelines are a “system of guided discretion” that advises 
sentencing courts in “choos[ing] a sentence within [the] 
statutory limits.” Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894–95 (emphasis 
added). 
Third, Folk’s reliance on Peugh and Molina-Martinez is 
misplaced. Both cases involved direct appeals and not 
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postconviction collateral attacks. See Spencer, 773 F.3d at 
1144 (discussing Peugh’s differences); see also Molina-
Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1341. The standards employed in both 
cases were “far less demanding than the standard” Folk “must 
satisfy: that an error in the application of [the] advisory 
[G]uidelines ‘inherently results in a complete miscarriage of 
justice.’” See Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1144 quoting Hill, 368 U.S. 
at 428). In Peugh, the petitioner had to show that “a change in 
law create[d] a significant risk of a higher sentence.” Hawkins, 
724 F.3d at 917 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Peugh, 569 U.S. at 550). And in Molina-Martinez, the 
petitioner had to demonstrate error creating a “reasonable 
probability of a different outcome.” 136 S. Ct. at 1346. Finally, 
Peugh involved a constitutional error—a violation of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause. 569 U.S. at 538–39. Thus, the constitutional 
error—and not a nonconstitutional error misapplying a 
Sentencing Guideline—“invalidated the sentence.” Hawkins, 
724 F.3d at 916 (discussing Peugh). 
Molina-Martinez established a mere “rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice” on direct appeal when a sentencing 
court miscalculates a Guidelines range, see Payano, 930 F.3d 
at 193, which suggests that the error does not inherently result 
in a complete miscarriage of justice. 
Essentially, Folk contends that perhaps the District 
Court would impose an even lower sentence on remand. And 
because that possibility exists, Folk asserts that he is prejudiced 
and the incorrect career-offender designation is a fundamental 
defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. 
But it is also possible that, after further review of the § 3553(a) 
factors, the District Court would resentence Folk to the same 
sentence—or perhaps a higher one. We will not speculate 
about how a district court might resentence a criminal 
defendant were we to grant collateral relief. Even if one 
hypothetical judge might lower a sentence upon remand, 
another judge may not. And the theoretical possibility of a 
lower sentence does not demonstrate the type of prejudice 
necessary to show that the criminal defendant’s current 
sentence rests on a fundamental defect inherently resulting in 
a complete miscarriage of justice. Cf. Foote, 784 F.3d at 942; 
Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1142–43; Hawkins, 724 F.3d at 917; Sun 
Bear, 644 F.3d at 706. 
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* * * 
In sum, we hold that a nonconstitutional claim based on 
an incorrect career-offender enhancement under the advisory 
Guidelines is not cognizable under § 2255. Because Folk’s 
career-offender claim is not cognizable, we need not address 
whether his previous convictions are “crimes of violence” 
under the career-offender Guideline. 
IV 
Folk has moved to expand the certificate of 
appealability to include his argument under our decision in 
Rowe, 919 F.3d 752. To resolve the motion, we must decide 
whether (a) Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of 
appealability is properly construed as a motion to amend his 
§ 2255 motion or as a second or successive habeas motion,8 
and (b) Folk’s motion survives the resulting standard. Based 
on our precedent, Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of 
appealability is a second or successive habeas motion. We also 
conclude that it fails to satisfy § 2255’s standard for second or 
successive habeas motions. So we will deny Folk’s motion to 
expand the certificate of appealability. 
A 
If a federal prisoner “has expended the ‘one full 
opportunity to seek collateral review’” that § 2255 affords him, 
then a later-filed motion to expand the scope of his § 2255 
motion is a second or successive motion. Santarelli, 929 F.3d 
at 105 (quoting Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 413 (3d Cir. 
2011)). A federal prisoner has expended his opportunity for 
collateral review if he “has exhausted all of [his] appellate 
remedies with respect to [his] initial habeas petition.” Id. But 
if a federal prisoner’s first § 2255 motion has not been 
resolved, then a motion to expand the scope of his § 2255 
motion is a motion to amend. Id. at 105–06. 
 
8 Even though Folk filed his motion to expand the certificate of 
appealability with this Court, we may still find that it is a 
motion to amend. See, e.g., United States v. Santarelli, 929 
F.3d 95, 106 (3d Cir. 2019) (construing a petition filed with 
this Court during an appeal as a motion to amend). 
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Thus, whether Folk’s motion to expand the certificate 
of appealability is a motion to amend or a second or successive 
§ 2255 motion depends on whether his incorrect career-
offender enhancement claims is cognizable. See id. It is not, so 
Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability is a 
second or successive habeas petition because Folk has 
“expended the ‘one full opportunity to seek collateral review’” 
that § 2255 affords him. See id. (quoting Blystone, 664 F.3d at 
413).9  
B 
Having determined that Folk’s motion to expand the 
certificate of appealability is a second or successive § 2255 
motion, we must now decide whether to certify it. We must 
certify a federal prisoner’s second or successive § 2255 motion 
if the motion contains: (1) “newly discovered evidence … 
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of 
the offense;” or (2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)–(2).  
Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability 
presents neither newly discovered evidence nor a new rule of 
constitutional law, so we will not certify Folk’s motion as a 
second or successive § 2255 motion. As Folk concedes, “Rowe 
. . . is not ‘new evidence.’” See Appellant’s Reply to Gov’t’s 
Resp. to Mot. By Appellant to Expand the Certificate of 
Appealability and Permit Suppl. Briefing 5 n.3 (June 18, 2019). 
So he fails to satisfy § 2255(h)’s first prong. And Rowe was a 
decision of this Court—and not the Supreme Court—so Folk 
does not satisfy § 2255(h)’s second prong. Accordingly, we 
will deny his motion. 
V 
Today we join every other circuit court of appeals in 
deciding that an incorrect career-offender enhancement under 
 
9 If we had decided to vacate or reverse the District Court, “the 
district court would again be vested with jurisdiction to 
consider” the motion to expand the certificate of appealability 
as a motion to amend. Santarelli, 929 F.3d at 106. 
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the advisory Guidelines does not present a cognizable claim 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Thus, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Folk’s § 2255 motion. We will also deny 
Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability 
because he does not satisfy the standard for a second or 
successive § 2255 motion. 
